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Abstract 
 
This article examines the culture-shaping strategies pursued through French educational policies. It 
traces the process through which the republican education system claimed legitimacy to bring all 
citizens into its universalising embrace, and to institute a form of national popular culture. At the 
same time, the article shows how specifications of esoterically ‘universal’ and ‘general’ curricular 
content were used to maintain barriers between elite and popular classes. The article then explores 
endeavours since the 1940s to delineate more democratically framed notions of ‘general’ or 
‘common’ culture, and the difficulties that have accompanied the integration of such perspectives 
into mass secondary schooling since the 1960s. In particular, one sees in France persistent 
disjunctions between the ‘universal’ cultures carried by academic curricula and contemporary 
popular cultures and experience (though the balance of power between these poles has shifted in 
some respects). 
 
Keywords: French educational policy, French cultural policy, implict cultural policy, common culture, 
popular culture and education 
 
 
Among very early references to the terms ‘ministry of culture’ and ‘minister of culture’ in 
French are some that do not refer to State departments or political figures, and antedate the 
deployment of the terms for those entities by several decades. Writing in 1910, Charles Péguy 
evokes polemically the exhausting ‘ministry of culture’ exerted as a vocation by primary and 
secondary school teachers whom he describes as so many ‘ministers of culture’ (Péguy 1961, pp. 
529-31).1 Clearly, Péguy is building on the long established ecclesiastical understanding of the terms 
(whereby parish priests exert their religious ‘ministry’ among local populations), even if many of the 
teachers in question would have been following an emphatically secular agenda. For, Péguy, 
moreover, this ‘ministry’ was one that was being borne by committed individuals preserving a flame 
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against the deadening and instrumentalizing prescriptions of central government and educational 
authorities. Clearly, there was more than an element of nostalgia, even at the time, in Péguy’s 
lyricised portrait. If one wanted a version of such a ‘minister’ transposed into an active myth for our 
own times, one might turn to the harrassed but multiply attentive middle-school teacher in Laurent 
Cantet’s 2008 simulated documentary Entre les murs. Nevertheless, it is striking that this early usage 
of the term locates ‘cultural ministry’ as an activity at the interface specifically between State 
educational institutions and the populations they were designed to shape. 
This leaves open the question of the actual cultural resources deployed for shaping these 
populations, and the overall aims of such projects. Educational policies work on popular cultures 
(even, and sometimes especially, when they profess to ignore popular cultures altogether). They 
also, in a sense, institute forms or aspects of popular culture when they bring into their embrace all 
of a nation’s people and become a routine part of popular experience (initially, in France, at primary 
level, but in recent decades up to at least secondary level). The ways in which this takes place can be 
brought into particular focus  if we relate our understanding of what is  ‘popular’ about cultures to 
other epithets used to inform and legitimise cultural-educational programmes. For the purposes of 
this article, I will focus on the ‘universal’, the ‘general’, and the ‘common’. 
 
(I should perhaps note that the term ‘popular culture’ is not used here only, or indeed 
primarily, in its now dominant anglophone sense of contemporary consumer culture. It refers more 
broadly to cultures emerging from, imposed upon or appropriated by ‘popular’ classes as variously 
distinguished from counter-posited elites. The categories in question are not socio-historically 
stable, and need to be relationally defined and internally differentiated as the historical focus of 
analysis shifts). 
 
Universal Authority and Provision 
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 In order to set extensive educational policies, governments must generally mobilize some 
kind of overarching national cultural authority. Significant legitimacy is required for the deployment 
of substantial public resources to intervene so powerfully in the cultures of so many social groups, 
popular and elite (producing what the monarchist education minister François Guizot called in 1833 
the ‘governmnent of minds’ (Mayeur 2004, p. 335; Rosanvallon 1990, pp. 113-16)). One of the 
striking features of French educational history is the extent to which governments have had to lay 
claim to a higher and more expressly ‘universal’ authority when framing educational policies. This is 
due in large part to the background against which the republican tradition in French educational 
policy emerged. General schooling in pre-revolutionary France was the province of the Catholic 
Church, and the Church would remain a strategic force in the educational field thereafter. As its 
name implies (katholikos – general or universal), this schooling was delivered, theoretically at least, 
in the name of a universal truth ordained for the universality of humankind. The republican 
challenge to the educational dominion of this transnational body within the nation had to trump this 
claim to universal authority. The ‘lay’ tradition as it emerged in France, first discursively and then 
institutionally, thus incorporated powerful claims as to its validity for all French citizens.  Its 
revolutionary pioneer Condorcet argued in 1792 that ‘the moral principles taught in *…+ schools *…+ 
will be those which, being based on our natural sentiments and reason, belong equally to all men’ 
(Condorcet 2000, p.197).  A century later, the republican philosopher Charles Renouvier articulated 
the general implications that this transfer of authority appeared to bring with it: the State, once in a 
position of supremacy, would have to assume ‘responsibility for souls just like any church or 
community, but in a more universal manner’ (Renouvier 1876, p. 100, quoted in Gauchet 2005, pp. 
64-5). In other words, he ascribed to educational policy a general responsibility for the culture of the 
people. 
 Establishing a principle of authority, whether philosophical or political, over national 
education is one thing. Ensuring effective universal provision is another. The universalizing 
educational principles first articulated during the Revolution were important, but its concrete 
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achievements in this respect, as might be expected given the context, were extremely meagre 
(Mayeur 2004, pp. 82-4). Indeed, in a rather different respect, there was something of a mismatch 
between the claims of the early Third Republic’s educational reformers to have created a primary 
school system for all the French people and the precise nature of their more limited, though still 
considerable, achievement. 
 There was only one institution, in the wake of the Revolution, in a position to bring anything 
like a universal reach to the task of national primary instruction. Napoleon may have brought 
secondary education under State control, but he had to rely on the Catholic Church to run and 
maintain a network of primary schools. The Church played a major part in the spread of primary 
schooling and the decrease in illiteracy rates over the next seventy-five years, as did legislation 
passed by succeeding non-republican governments. Thus by the time the Third Republic had 
consolidated itself and was in a position in the 1880s to pass its regime-defining ‘fundamental laws’ 
in education, a quasi-comprehensive network of primary schools was already in place. There had 
been some 14,000 communes out of 38,000 without a primary school in 1829; by 1863 this had 
dropped to 818 (see Prost 1979, pp. 89-211). 
 If one considered simply the numbers of schools created and the rise in pupil attendance, 
one might conclude that the republican reformers of the late 1870s and 1880s simply ‘filled in the 
gaps’ in existing ‘voluntary’ provision, as the British government of the time expressly set itself the 
task of doing.2 Certainly, they did bring the numbers of school-age children and the numbers of 
children at school ever closer together, particularly at the upper end of the 7-13 age range. But their 
real achievement lay in a more fundamental reframing of primary education provision overall as a 
universal public service to which all citizens, as such, had a right. This construction was built upon 
three basic foundations: national education was to be made free of charge (but not charitably); it 
was an obligation; it was non-clerical (laïque). Popular education (the education of the ‘people’) was 
thereby made into a quasi-constitutional principle of State. 
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A General (Primary) Culture for the People?  
 
 The considerations above still revolve, in a sense, around a rather formal notion of the 
universal. Certainly, they are concerned with the conditions of effective provision. But they address 
issues of pedagogical content – what is actually delivered in a universal manner - only insofar as they 
touch upon its general acceptability (which, in the context of the time, entailed inevitably a neuralgic 
fixation on elements of clericalism and anti-clericalism). But the notion of universality poses also a 
different kind of question for popular schooling. Is its purpose to provide pupils simply with what is 
necessary – with the ‘rudiments’ they require to get by in life? Or is it to provide them with content 
of more general interest, to transmit a culture of potentially more universal value? And what kind of 
choices might that imply within a framework of limited resources? 
 The ‘rudimentary’ approach to primary education had certainly had its advocates 
throughout the nineteenth century, from Napoleon to Thiers’ famous pronouncement in 1848 (in 
reaction to the radical project of the Second Republic’s Minister for Public Instruction Hippolyte 
Carnot) that ‘reading, writing and counting is what they have to learn; all the rest is superfluous’. But 
there was another strand in the development of a curriculum for public primary schools. Jules Ferry 
set out to build on previous efforts by such as Guizot in the 1830s and the Second Empire inspector 
Octave Gréard in the 1860s to bring primary schooling beyond the delivery of mere rudiments and 
towards something more universalizing in its scope. We can interpret in this perspective his 
insistence in 1881 that what had hitherto counted  as ‘accessories’ should henceforth be viewed as 
essential in the delivery of primary education: 
 
It is around the problem of the constitution of a truly educative programme that the 
Ministry of Public Instruction has expended all its efforts *…+. It is this overriding 
preoccupation that explains, brings together and harmonizes a very great number of 
measures which [otherwise] might offer grounds for reproaches concerning the excesses in 
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the new curricula, exaggerations in accessory details, programmes of study that are overly 
varied and that do not, on first inspection, appear sufficiently coherent: all those accessories 
to which we attach such value, and that we group together around the fundamental and 
traditional teaching of ‘reading, writing, and counting’ -  lessons based on physical objects, 
drawing, natural history, school museums, gymnastics, school walks, manual crafts in the 
workshop next to the school, singing, choral music. Why all these accessories? Because in 
our view they are what is most important, because these accessories make primary schools 
into schools of liberal education. That is the great distinction, the great line of separation 
between  the former regime, the traditional regime, and the new regime.3 
 
Claude Lelièvre, following Pierre Kahn, cautions against superimposing the ‘poetry’ that lyricizes in 
this way the projects of republican reformers upon the ‘prose’ of more routinized pedagogical 
practice at the time (in a different theoretical tradition, Péguy’s ‘ministers of culture’ as evoked 
above could  also be conceived as ‘street-level bureaucrats’4). Moreover, not only was there, as we 
shall see, a powerfully latent class-based dimension to Ferry’s overall primary policy that was 
masked by quotations such as this. The vehicle of a universalized primary education infrastructure 
was also set to work in a particular legitimization process designed to embed a still fragile republic as 
part of a bourgeois lay nation-building agenda (Hobsbawm 1992, pp. 263-73). Nonetheless 
statements such as Ferry’s gave force to a different kind of question. This concerned not simply who 
should hold dominion over national education and in the name of what. It asked rather what the 
contours might be of a culture that could be at once ‘general’ and commonly available – or, to put it 
another way, universalizing in scope as well as universalized in delivery. 
 
 
Segregated Universes 
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 If we consider as a whole the policy framework for primary schooling constructed by Ferry 
and his associates in the 1880s, we might say that they both raised and sidelined this question. Even 
putting aside the matter of the confessional ‘free’ schools that the legislation allowed, the public 
primary schools were not schools for the whole nation. They were schools for the popular classes – 
the peuple – but only for those classes. They instituted a ‘popular culture’ of a kind – but they 
underline for us the restrictive implications of the term. Social elites eschewed the schools 
altogether, sending their children to the petites classes of the lycées designed specifically to prepare 
pupils for secondary education proper. Indeed, Ferry himself expressly strengthened the position of 
these petites classes: they were exempted from the no-fee regime imposed by the law of 16 June 
1881 (they were thereby enabled to protect themselves from unwelcome social admixture); the 
qualification barriers for teaching in them were raised through the creation in 1881 of a specific 
certificate; and Ferry noted in a circular of 1882 that he was pleased to see new classes of this type 
opening to satisfy the kinds of families that standard primary schools could not. These petites classes 
would multiply throughout the Third Republic, catering to 16,000 pupils in 1881, 31,000 in 1913, and 
over 55,000 in 1930 (Lelièvre 2004, pp. 25-6). Indeed, it is better to see them as a form of pre-
secondary schooling, just as the public primary schools could feed some of their pupils into certain 
‘post-primary’ streams (notably the écoles primaires supérieures) that were kept resolutely separate 
from secondary institutions. Cross-over between the worlds of primary and secondary education 
was very difficult: secondary education began at 11, before primary education as such had ended, 
and to curtail one’s primary education to venture on a long and costly secondary education for 
which one had not been prepared was a gamble not many were prepared to make. Scholarships 
were available, but they were few and far between, and often awarded to State employees’ children 
as a kind of encouragement in lieu of promotion. Even when secondary education itself was made 
fully free from 1933, the barriers between these two social universes remained deep. For Prost, 
French educational provision prior to the reforms of the 1960s could not really be described as a 
‘system’ precisely because of this split into two discrete blocs operating according to different 
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principles and directives (Prost 1992, p. 88). Despite a certain republican universalist ethos running 
through French educational discourse, the reality of its educational institutions served to consolidate 
social stratification and to dichotomize cultural provision. 
 The paradox in all this, from the point of view of our focus in this article, is that the self-
consciously defined specificity of secondary education in France was that it was supposed to provide 
its pupils with a genuinely ‘general’ or ‘universal’ culture. The peculiarity of this claim to universality 
is brought into relief if we consider the functions of Latin, or ‘classical humanities’ more generally, 
both within the curriculum and in broader discourses about the purposes of education. 
 The classical humanities (the study of Latin and Greek) had long been the defining element 
of French secondary education, notwithstanding an important parallel strand making the case for a 
more scientifically and socially operational form of curriculum.5 The explicit case for their 
preeminence was based on the putatively universal value attributed to the high texts of antiquity 
(suitably excerpted, anthologized, and synthesized for edificatory purposes with a Christian 
tradition). The essence of humanity was deemed to be fundamentally unchanging, and had best 
been expressed in these texts and in the elevated sentiments they articulated (Durkheim 1990, pp. 
368-70). The purpose of this ‘high literary education’ was to bring children out of the ‘vain and banal’ 
notions they might express in French, and, via the incomparable ‘vigour’ of thought induced through 
classical languages, give their speech, ‘through true art and true culture *…+ a kind of new, more 
noble and elevated form’.6 The major reforms in secondary pedagogical method that took place 
from the 1870s changed the rationale for studying the classics but not, substantially, their 
preeminence in the curriculum (Mayeur 2004, pp. 553-6; Prost 1979, pp. 246-9). They emerged from 
the critique of the rote-based and formulaic approach to producing especially Latin prose and verse, 
and indeed the increasingly manifest absurdity of devoting so much time to writing in a language 
that few students afterwards would actively use. Emphasis was to be placed henceforth on 
understanding the texts, translating them into French, and writing essays in French. The content of 
the Latin texts was less significant now than what was presented as their incomparably logical syntax 
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and the abstract gymnastics it provided for the mind. It was precisely their emptiness that provided 
the condition for their supposedly universal value: because they were not limited by being really 
‘about’ anything in particular, they prepared the mind for any number of subsequent applications.7 
 Clearly the case in itself was often sincerely made (in more nuanced form than the summary 
above), and anticipates in some respects certain contemporary arguments for the value of a 
humanities education. But the very particular sociological circumstances in which these claims for 
universal value were advanced as principles marks them out as heavily overdetermined. The fixation 
on Latin, in particular, revealed an implicit segregatory agenda beneath the variety of explicit 
rationales for its prioritization. These issues were pinpointed quite clearly by Edmond Goblot in a 
classic work on the French bourgeoisie: 
 
Those who are considered to be the enemies of Latin studies are, on the contrary, those who 
would like to see them being pursued more seriously and to a more advanced level. But for 
that to take place, they must not be imposed on all. They would have to be tackled by very 
gifted minds who, finding the work easier *…+, would be able to pursue them in conjunction  
with other studies, notably the sciences. They would form an elite. Others, given the 
insufficiency of their intelligence or perseverance, would have to resign themselves to a 
more reduced culture. But that is just what the current self-styled defenders of Latin do not 
want; what they want is for Latin studies to continue to be imposed by a common rule upon 
the whole bourgeois class. Their only reason for this, though they may be unwilling to admit 
it, is to maintain between the social classes this distinction that is so clear and easily 
graspable: on the one hand, those who know no Latin, and on the other – I hesitate to say 
those who know it – those who once learnt it. 
For what would happen if one could undertake secondary studies without Latin? An 
intelligent and hard-working pupil, completing his elementary primary studies with further 
schooling in the primary sector, or even in a good technical school, might become more 
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educated and even more cultivated than an average secondary school pupil. There would no 
longer be that inequality of culture that distinguishes the social classes: everything would be 
mixed together. The bourgeois need an education that remains inaccessible to the people, 
which is closed to the people, which is a barrier. And it is not enough that a bourgeois pupil 
has received this education, because people might not notice it. A State diploma, a piece of 
parchment signed by the minister, certifying officially that he has learnt Latin, gives him the 
right not to know it.8 
 
It had not been straightforward, as it happened, to impose Latin studies as the key element in an 
elite common culture in the decades preceding Goblot’s study. Not only had it been difficult to 
contrive a framework wherein a key fraction of the elite would no longer forsake Latin in order to 
pursue a scientific curriculum. The secondary education corporation also had to deal with a 
newcomer, as Victor Duruy’s ‘special’ vocationally orientated studies, established in 1865, morphed 
by stages into a ‘modern’ section of the baccalauréat, insistently held at a distance from other 
sections due precisely to the inadequacy of its Latin provision (Mayeur 2004, pp. 566-78; Prost 1979, 
pp. 252-7). 
 Of course, the precise ‘barrier’ diagnosed by Goblot would not hold in the long term, and 
can seem rather artificial to modern eyes. But similar barriers, superimposing explicit universal 
cultural rationales upon implicit segregative functions, would replace it. One of the effects of the 
pedagogical reforms in the last decades of the nineteenth century, with greater emphasis on writing 
in French, was to bring forth the specification for education of a ‘home-grown’ classical French 
literary canon. The early work of Bourdieu and Passeron showed how this was playing by the 1960s 
the same kind of role that Latin studies once had (Bourdieu and Passeron 1979 and 1977). The 
apologies for classical humanities at the turn of the century are likely to seem strained or 
uninvolving to us. But this very fact serves to bring into clearer relief a recurrent function that they 
exemplify: the policy specification of a curriculum or system of reference designed to be common to 
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an elite, to have universally acknowledged value as regards its contents, but which is also expressly 
constituted so as to be non-universal in its effective availability. 
 
 
 
A Democratic General Culture 
 
 Ferdinand Buisson, one of the prime architects of the ‘fundamental’ education laws passed 
in the 1880s, was conscious earlier than most both of their practical limitations and of the way in 
which the ‘religious question’ in education served to obscure a more general ‘social question’. He 
saw in the France of May 1914 
 
two kinds of youth: the elite and the masses. The elite consists of some three hundred 
thousand children to whom society gives the most complete intellectual education. The 
masses comprise five or six million children whose instruction – assuming that it is really 
given to them – will extend simply to reading, writing and counting. 
Who marks out the boundaries between these two groups? What accounts for this 
difference in intellectual treatment? Who benefits from education in its noble form? Who 
are those condemned to a pitifully truncated education? There is only one criterion, one 
mode of differentiation: money.  (Buisson 2003, p. 321) 
 
Others came to share Buisson’s concerns. Their forced experience of social mixing during the First 
World War convinced a group of academics (the ‘Compagnons de l’Université nouvelle’) that the 
nation required a more democratic form of schooling – a shared ‘single school’ (école unique) that 
would ensure universal provision and a measure of popularly accessible universal content. This 
campaign for a ‘single school’ was taken up by others between the wars, notably by Jean Zay, the 
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education minister at the time of the Popular Front (Prost 1992, pp. 47-97). I shall focus here firstly 
on one prominent moment in the slow move towards a ‘single school’ in France and  the reflection 
upon a non-elite ‘common culture’ that intermittently accompanied it. 
 The Langevin-Wallon report (1947) has often been ascribed a somewhat mythical status in 
the development of French educational policy. Its two authors, the leading communist intellectuals 
Paul Langevin (a physicist) and Henri Wallon (a psychologist) were recruited by the left-wing Gaullist 
education minister René Capitant in November 1944 to head a commission framing major 
educational reform in France. Many proposals regarding this were circulating at the time, most 
aiming to break with the educational arrangements of the discredited Third Republic. Langevin and 
Wallon embarked on the project with a view to initiating a wide-ranging democratization of 
provision. However, by the time the definitive report was passed to the incumbent minister in June 
1947, the political window that had given rise to the commission had definitively passed. The 
euphoria and sense of common purpose that had characterized late 1944 had evaporated, giving 
way to sweeping budget restrictions, a Cold War, and the ejection the previous month of all 
communist ministers from government. The authors were fulsomely thanked and their report put 
into a ministerial bottom drawer, whence it would not emerge for many years. Its mapping of a new 
educational system had become a dead letter without political support; its reconceptualization of 
‘culture’ at school and beyond was widely attacked as undermining the conditions for France’s 
traditional cultural distinction (see Sorel 1997). 
 Since then, however, and with the benefit of hindsight, the report’s significance has come to 
be evaluated in altogether different terms. It has been seen as laying down the blueprint for the 
‘systematization’ of French education that took place from the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 
1959 to the Haby laws of 1975. This led notably to the raising of the school-leaving age to 16, the 
establishment of a single type of school in which all pupils would be educated up to that age (the 
collège unique) and the definition of a common programme to be followed (the tronc commun). This 
undoubtedly corresponded to the broad recommendations of the Langevin-Wallon report, and can 
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be seen as a comprehensively universalizing process. François Dubet, however, questions the extent 
to which this outcome can be attributed to the direct influence of Langevin and Wallon, whose role 
in this regard he sees as indirectly ‘prophetic’ (Dubet 2004, p. 115). They foresaw the kinds of social 
and economic changes to which de Gaulle looked to respond in the 1960s,  requiring greater levels 
of qualification to augment the country’s human capital and satisfy parental demand in a time of 
rising prosperity. It was this that led de Gaulle (working against the passive resistance in this respect 
of both his education minister and his prime minister Pompidou) to institute in 1963 the collège 
d’enseignement secondaire, designed to take further able children previously confined to post-
primary forms of education. This collège would notionally bring all pupils under one roof between 
the ages of 11 and 15, but (Pompidou insisted on this) it retained within it different and largely 
hermetic streams that perpetuated the previous modes of social and cultural segregation. It was the 
abolishing of these discrete streams that led under Giscard d’Estaing’s education minister René Haby 
to the establishment of the ‘collège unique’ in 1975 (Lelièvre 2004, pp. 75-91). 
 Comparison suggests that something similar would have developed in France with or 
without the Langevin-Wallon report. This was France’s version of a ‘comprehensivization’ of 
secondary education that also took place in a number of other countries, responding to similar 
economic and social pressures, albeit following different rhythms and degrees of systematization.9 
For Dubet, however, the Langevin-Wallon report’s enduring interest derives not from its influence 
over the formal structures of French education. Rather, it remains significant because it attends to  
dimensions of the universalization of public education that have since been persistently neglected. 
The transition to the collège unique corresponded, in Dubet’s account, to a universalization focused 
on institutional structures at the expense of pedagogical content (see also Dubet 1998, 2004a, and 
2008). All pupils now passed through (notionally) the same kind of school, but not enough thought 
had been given to how the curriculum should be changed to take account of the now very different 
clientèle in attendance. An educational fare designed to prepare a previous elite for further 
academic study was now served out to the population as a whole, who had very different objectives, 
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horizons, and centres of interest. For Dubet, this mismatch lay behind many of the problems into 
which teachers at collèges would run over the next decades. In terms of our problematic, a culture 
that had long been assumed to be of potentially universal value and relevance was not so. It was 
necessary to rethink the contours of a ‘general culture’ fit to become a ‘common’ culture for 
obligatory mass schooling. The Langevin-Wallon report contains suggestive indications in this regard 
if we venture briefly on the kind of reading of it that Dubet invites. 
 
 The report emphasized from early on that, in addition to its economic significance, the state 
educational policy that they had in mind corresponded also, in effect, to a universalizing and 
comprehensive cultural policy (though the term as such is not used): 
 
Education must *…+ offer equal possibilities for development to all, and open access to 
culture for everyone; it must become democratized less through a process of selection that 
takes away from the people those who are most gifted than through an ongoing elevation  
of the whole nation’s cultural level. (Langevin and Wallon 2004, p. 18) 
 
This statement introduces a first break with regard to conceptions of academic democratization that 
had previously prevailed. The point was not simply, as part of a meritocratic agenda, to open doors 
to high educational and cultural provision to classes of people for whom those doors had previously 
been shut. The focus was rather on raising the cultural ‘level’ of the people taken as a whole. And 
this entailed a second important break with accepted thinking. The abstract defence of ‘general 
culture’ might be an expected component of such a report, but the authors constructed the notion 
in a rather different way. They recast it so that it constitutively linked up with those spheres of 
‘popular’ activity from which it had theretofore constitutively distinguished itself: 
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We conceive general culture *…+ as an initiation to the diverse forms of human activity, not 
simply to determine individuals’ aptitudes, enabling them to make informed choices before 
entering a profession, but also to allow them to remain in contact with other people, to 
understand the interest and appreciate the results of activities other than their own, and to 
situate their own activities cogently in relation to society as a whole. (Langevin and Wallon 
2004, p. 20) 
 
‘General culture’ was thus something not to be reserved only for the higher echelons of a socially 
stratified school system, but was intended, understood in these terms, precisely for the general 
mass of the necessarily specialized labour force: 
 
General culture represents what brings people together and unifies them, whereas 
professions represent too often what separates them. A solid general culture must thus 
serve as a basis for professional specialization and continue during the period of professional 
apprenticeship in such a way that people’s education as a whole is not limited or hobbled by 
their training as technicians. In a democratic state, where every worker is also a citizen, it is 
essential that specialization should not be an obstacle to the understanding of wider 
problems and that a broad and solid culture should liberate people from the narrow 
limitations of the technician (pp. 20-21) 
 
In intellectual terms, their vision was certainly broader than the kind of classical-humanities vision of 
general culture discussed above. As might be expected from a physicist such as Langevin, the 
discipline of scientific thought was ascribed a key role in the process they called the ‘culture of the 
critical mind’ (ibid.,  p. 72) .10 But in social terms also, their vision added a decidedly unbookish if 
doubtless somewhat utopian dimension to the kind of universal service that schooling might 
provide. Indeed, the implication of their argument was that what had theretofore counted as 
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‘general culture’ (and that we might better label ‘high culture’) did not properly merit the name. It 
led to disdain or ignorance about entire domains of general social activity (such as the demands of 
manual or service professions). The report signalled in effect that this scholastically transmitted 
culture  – a particular ‘classification of real values’ - required substantial remodelling: 
 
The broadening of pupils’ horizons and their preparation for life in the community will take 
place through progressive initiation (as often as possible through direct contact) with social 
reality. Adolescents will be led less through books and lessons than through visits, 
investigations and personal research towards the critical analysis of the social, 
administrative and political structure. An important place should be reserved for learning 
about the different professions, their role, their evolution, their conditions of work. An exact 
appreciation of the fundamental role of workers, of the solidarity between diverse human 
activities, will direct adolescents towards an understanding of the duties and rights of 
citizens (p. 73). 
 
All this struck many contemporary readers as  irresponsible social fantasy revealing the crypto-
communist agenda of the report’s authors (see Sorel 1997, pp. 196-200). The report certainly took 
from communist thinking a more probing approach to the possible relations between work and 
culture, and a more demanding sense of educational and cultural ‘justice’, than previous 
programmes had done. It fused these with the dominant themes of the ‘new education’ movement 
(learning by doing, active learning methods, etc.). That is not to say that it thereby generated the last 
word in educational policy development. However, it did produce considerably more than the 
institutional skeleton of a reformed school system, by reflecting on the implications for universally 
extended schooling of producing a curriculum that might be of more universal value. 
 
School culture and popular cultures 
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 The question of a democratically framed general culture – or what to do with the now 
‘common trunk’ of obligatory secondary schooling – re-emerged once the collège unique introduced 
during the mid-1970s had bedded down and some of the pedagogical problems it brought with it 
had come more clearly into focus. An early response to these problems was somewhat shocking to 
conventional ‘republican universal’ thinking in France, insofar as it broke with the long aspiration to 
give exactly equal provision to all citizens. Indeed, it was perhaps the first (initially unspoken) 
example of ‘positive discrimination’ within French public policy. The socialist government in 1981 
officially recognised that, notwithstanding centralized and standardized provision, not all collèges 
were in fact equal, due to their very different local social, economic and cultural contexts. In 
response, they proposed, through a  ‘Zones for Educational Priority’ policy, to give more resources to 
those schools in the most disadvantaged areas, with the aim of bringing them closer to levels of 
academic achievement in more favoured institutions.11 Yet this response in terms of differentiated 
economic allocation alone was not seen as sufficient. Attention had to be given to the curriculum 
itself, such that it could be more effectively negotiated by the generality of pupils, while providing a 
‘good’ of more obviously universal relevance and significance. 
 One apparently obvious response at this level might have been to introduce elements of 
existing ‘popular cultures’ (notably working-class cultures) into the curriculum. There has been a 
pedagogical counter-tradition in England, with connections to the early formation of ‘cultural 
studies’, that has sought to do just this, seeking in various ways to ‘recast’ education as ‘a process of 
cultural dialogue’ (Jones 2003, p. 60).12 Even here, however, such streams existed for a long time 
within a more routinized ‘conservatism’ characterising the country’s ‘cultures of teaching’ (ibid., p. 
88). Moreover, since the prime minister James Callaghan’s attack in 1976 on pedagogical autonomy, 
or the ‘secret garden of the curriculum’ ( Ball 2008, pp. 73-4), increasing levels of centralization 
under conservative and New Labour governments have turned schools into very different 
institutions where such forms of cultural experimentation have become more difficult. Schools are 
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under multiple and measurable pressures to ‘perform’ (and thus conform). David Buckingham has 
followed numerous contemporary forms of such experimentation, and is a good guide to the 
difficulties and pitfalls associated with them (Buckingham 1998). In his judgement, the gap in 
England is actually ‘widening *…+ between the culture of the school and the culture of children’s lives 
outside the school’ (Buckingham 2005, p. 26). Indeed, referring to more recent developments in 
juvenile culture (as the French would say), Buckingham diagnoses an ‘extraordinary contrast 
between the high levels of activity and enthusiasm that characterise children’s consumer cultures 
and the passivity that increasingly suffuses their schooling’ (ibid., p. 14). 
In France, experiments with the curriculum at local level, and particularly the admixture of 
elements of ‘popular’ cultures within consecrated ‘school’ cultures, have been altogether more 
difficult, due in part to the strong centralization that has long permeated nearly all aspects of the 
education system. Certainly, there have been influential systematic critiques of that system, such as 
those of Passeron and Bourdieu in the 1960s and 1970s, who saw that ‘for the sons of peasants, 
manual workers, clerks or small shopkeepers,  the acquisition of school culture represents a process 
of acculturation’ (Bourdieu 1979, p. 22, trans. mod.). Yet Bourdieu and Passeron were highly critical 
of the ‘abdication’ promoted by any ‘populist illusion that might lead to claims for the admission 
within the culture taught in school of those parallel cultures carried by the most disadvantaged 
classes ‘ (p. 72, trans. mod.). In this French educational tradition, ‘emancipation’ for popular classes 
is achieved by enabling them to escape from the limited (or even ‘mutilated’) cultures into which 
they are born.  Forty years later, the sociologist Dominique Pasquier noted that traditional 
‘humanist’ culture remained central to the French school curriculum (Pasquier, 2005, p. 21). In her 
assessment, the ‘current crisis in schools does not revolve simply around the difficulty of managing  
more disparate academic levels than in the past; it is rooted equally in the strangeness that 
characterises for many pupils the world of humanist culture’ (ibid., pp. 161-2). However, the 
environment within which this ‘strangeness’ is perceived and managed has changed significantly. As 
Pasquier puts it, the ‘dominant’ culture within the  experience of contemporary schoolchildren is no 
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longer the ‘culture of the dominant class’, but an assertive and commercially mediated ‘popular 
culture’ (ibid., p. 162). The issue is not simply now the marginalisation of popular cultures within 
school, but also the assertive marginalisation of academic cultures within mass adolescent 
experience.13 
 
Prescribing a Common Culture 
  
There has thus been comparatively little scope in France for bringing closer the worlds of 
classroom experience and the increasingly autonomous universes of ‘juvenile’ culture (the issue is 
not black and white, needless to say – the preservation of a certain distance between the two is 
surely a valuable function of schooling as an institution). Insofar as the specifically cultural 
challenges of mass secondary schooling have been addressed at all, they have tended to give rise to 
a different kind of question. This has generally been formulated at the level of the central 
prescription of curriculum contents rather than that of ‘negotiation’ between different cultures at 
classroom level. In this perspective, a democratic form of mass secondary schooling should not limit 
its work to a mode of more or less meritocratic ‘fractional distillation’, sorting its populations into 
greater and lesser degrees of capability (and effectively weeding out from its higher reaches swathes 
of pupils from the ‘popular’ classes) ( Dubet 2008). The function of such schooling should also be to 
equip its pupils with a shared set of aptitudes and general references for navigating the 
contemporary world – a ‘common culture’. 
 Attempts were made from the mid-1980s within a number of policy contexts to address this 
issue, though in Claude Lelièvre’s view it was a question that was repeatedly raised only to be 
recurrently buried (Lelièvre, 2004, pp. 93, 101 and Lelièvre 2008). This was partly no doubt due to its 
intrinsic political, cultural and technical difficulties – who has the authority and competence finally 
to arbitrate on the contents of a veritably common culture? It was also certainly due to disciplinary 
and corporative resistance within the educational field (from those fearful of a dumbing down or a 
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vulgarization of culture). François Mitterrand (prompted via Jacques Attali by Pierre Bourdieu) 
sought in 1984 a first way around these problems by giving his presidential authority to the highest 
cultural authority – the professors of the elite Collège de France – to define a new set of orientations 
for secondary school curricula. The report was driven and authored in large measure by Bourdieu 
himself, and its reflection would be taken further in the the report he wrote with Frédéric Gros for 
the Socialist Minister of Education Lionel Jospin in 1989. One of the the principal recommendations 
developed across these two reports was that the state should institute and guarantee a ‘common 
cultural minimum’ which all pupils would have a right to receive before the end of their obligatory 
schooling. This was to be defined in an open and universalizing rather than a closed and ‘minimalist’ 
manner, being based on certain fundamental and transposable ‘modes of thought’ that might be 
taught using approaches that privileged practical experimentation and exploration.14 Bourdieu was 
critical in the extreme of the educational ‘back to basics’ campaign launched around the same time 
by Mitterrand’s Minister of Education between 1984 and 1986, Jean-Pierre Chevènement. For 
Bourdieu, this amounted to populist demagoguery insofar as it locked popular classes into 
educational contents that parents recognised and endorsed precisely because it was all they had 
been given by the schooling of their time.15 This conflict between, as it were, a ‘maximalizing’ and a 
‘rudimentary’ approach to a common cultural minimum reactivates, in a sense, some of the debates 
around primary education in the nineteenth century. It may not be, in practical terms, 
straightforward to resolve in definitive terms.  
The issue was put on – and taken off - the agenda again at regular intervals over the next 
two decades. After the two reports propelled by Bourdieu, it was raised again in the mid-1990s by 
the National Curricular Council (Conseil National des Programmes), a steering body created as a 
result of the Bourdieu-Gros report (Raulin 2006); and by François Dubet and Marie Duru-Bellat in the 
report they wrote for the Socialist minister for school education, Ségolène Royal, in 1999 
(Bergounioux et al. 1999). But even when the issue finally appeared to make its way from 
proposition to prominent governmental programme in 2005, it was argued by some that this was 
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simply another way of putting it aside (Lelièvre 2008, p. 95). In response partly to the Thélot report 
of 2004, the major education bill of April 2005 included as its article 9 the provision that: 
 
Obligatory schooling must at least guarantee for each pupil the necessary means for 
acquiring a common plinth (un socle commun) comprising a range of knowledge and skills 
that it is indispensable to master in order to complete one’s schooling successfully, pursue 
one’s training, construct one’s personal and professional future and succeed in one’s life in 
society. 
 
That ‘plinth’ has since been defined (in admittedly rather catch-all terms). But the debate has not 
been settled. Many suspect it of being a contemporary version of Thiers’ rudiments or 
Chevènementian basics. If everybody gets the plinth, asked the educationalist Philippe Meirieu in 
2006, then who gets the statue?16 In Dubet’s view , despite the heavy centralization that 
characterises the French system, the real purposes of mass secondary schooling (particularly 
between the ages of 11 and 15) are still not clearly ordered at a central level. It is up to teachers on 
the ground to steer a path between the demands of consecrated academic culture and the priorities 
of a ‘common culture’ (Dubet 2008, pp. 142-5). They are exercising an uncomfortable contemporary 
form of that ‘ministry’ (or street-level bureaucracy) evoked by Péguy at the beginning of this article. 
Questions of the universal, the general, the common and the popular are still at work in French 
educational policy debate. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 Mass secondary schooling is now a standard component of adolescent experience across all 
classes in France, as in many other countries. The collège now integrates virtually 100% of every 
generation between the ages of 11 and 15.  The percentage of pupils actually achieving the 
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baccalauréat at lycée level has gone from 11% in 1961 to  34% in 1981 and 65% in 2006 – with a 
further 5% taking it unsuccessfully that year (though sociologists of education have shown how this 
‘absolute’ expansion of opportunity coexists with multiple forms of covert segregation and splitting 
that makes the ‘democratization’ in question ‘relative’ at best). We have seen how this development 
has been accompanied by processes of mutual marginalisation between the manifest worlds of 
school culture and popular cultures.  Coming to terms with this divergence is a significant 
contemporary challenge for many pupils, who must synthesize those two worlds as best they can in 
their own experience. Stéphane Beaud evokes suggestively the nature of this challenge, as he traces 
the expectations raised among working-class pupils by governmental announcements in the 1980s 
that 80% of a generation would by 2000 have access to baccaluréat-level education, the 
disappointments and difficulties involved in negotiating an insufficiently adjusted curriculum, and 
the considerable subjective distress in framing a sufficiently ‘respectable’ identity for oneself after 
this experience (Beaud 2003). French educational strategy continues undoubtedly to work upon the 
popular – to bring it to a suitably ‘universal’ cultural level – but shows also, it seems, a persistent 
failure to attend to it in its own terms. 
 Jean Baubérot has noted how the universal within France, and particularly within French 
education, has often been constructed as an operational concept through a process of subtraction: 
pupils must, as it were, leave all marks of their particularity outside the classroom in order to engage 
with a realm of generality (Baubérot 2004, p. 46). The possibility of a more bottom-up approach, 
augmenting universality of perspective through the cumulative integration of singularity, has tended 
to be neglected. This has often produced, to borrow a term from Pierre Bourdieu, forms of symbolic 
violence. Regional cultures and languages were notoriously excised both from curricula and school 
playgrounds. Working-class and other popular cultures have been held apart from school cultures, 
augmenting the alienation of these pupils within a domain of academic generality that, objectively, 
was closer to the cultures of bourgeois milieux. Even now that the typical ‘balance of power’ 
between academic and popular cultures has shifted within the lived reality of most schools, 
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academic culture has tended to remain quite isolated with regard to developments outside it 
(Pasquier 2005). 
The disjunction between formal school curricula and popular experience has been brought 
out in different ways in recent international comparison. The OECD’s PISA surveys have had a bad 
press in France.17 Aspiring to measure the capacities in literacy, numeracy and science of member 
and associate nations’ fifteen-year-olds, they have repeatedly placed France in a rather mediocre 
position in relation to comparable countries. Their methodology has been  disputed, but the 
educational sociologists Christian Baudelot and Roger Establet suggest this methodological 
argument has largely been a pretext to avoid engaging with the surveys’ finding. They argue that the 
surveys are carefully constructed, and maintain that the education systems investigated are 
‘evaluated in reference to their fundamental values, social justice and efficacy, which are universal 
values, independently of the very different forms of organization that characterize each country’  
(Baudelot and Establet 2009, pp. 23-4). Certainly, the work of such international organizations is 
scarcely agenda-free (see Ball 2008, pp. 25-48). But what is important and new, for Baudelot and 
Establet, is the way in which these international comparisons render visible certain unhappy 
‘singularities’ of the French system (Baudelot and Establet 2009, pp. 47, 63). France holds, for 
example, the world ‘record’ (41% in 2003) in the proportion of fifteen-year-olds who have had to 
repeat at least one year of schooling – an indication of a continuing mismatch between the demands 
of the curriculum and the cultures of less advantaged pupils. French pupils perform satisfactorily 
when it is a question of retrieving information previously presented to them, but rather less well 
when they need to mobilize acquired knowledge in unfamiliar situations (ibid., pp. 47-8, 25-7). Most 
concerningly, ‘the country where the strongest claims are made for republican meritocracy is also 
one of those where academic destinies are most strongly linked to social origins and the cultural 
capital of families’ (p. 61). Indeed, when that cultural capital is broken down into its different 
elements, it appears that disposing at home of the paraphernalia associated with the most classical 
of cultures provides more than twice the comparative advantage for pupils in France than the 
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average for other nations (p. 69). The correlation of academic achievement and domestic cultural 
capital is, of course, a quasi-universal sociological law in itself. France’s singularizing feature appears 
to be, however, that its school system does considerably less than that of other countries to mitigate 
this law. The classical and ‘universal’ culture that has historically been a central component of its 
educational mission, and that has recurrently been framed so as to keep elements of the ‘popular’  
at bay, distinguishes the country also in less welcome ways. 
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NOTES 
                                                             
1 On the sub-departments for ‘fine arts’ and the two very ephemeral ministries for ‘art’ that had been assigned 
responsibility at central level for artistic matters since 1870, see Dubois 1999, pp. 23-108 and Poirrier 2000, pp. 
15-29. 
2 See Green 1992, pp. 302-3 (in reference to the 1870 Education Act). On English educational ‘voluntaryism’ 
more generally, see ibid., 264-8. 
3 Ferry’s speech to the Congrès des instituteurs et institutrices de France, 19 April 1881, quoted in Lelièvre, 
2004, pp. 21-2. 
4 On the dilemmas of ‘street-level bureaucrats’, see Lipsky 1980. 
5 For a long historical overview, see Durkheim 1990. The scientific strand came to the fore during the 
Revolution, but also existed in more routinized form during the nineteenth century, when candidates for the 
‘government schools’ of science and engineering (commonly called grandes écoles today) had to take an 
alternative route to the standard baccalauréat. 
6 Mgr. Dupanloup in an 1873 letter, quoted in Prost 1979, p. 66. 
7 See e.g. (but integrating a critical perspective) Durkheim 1990, pp. 363-72, 393-8 (these lectures date from 
1904-5). 
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8 Goblot 1930, pp. 123-4. On an analogous dynamic at work in nineteenth-century English deliberations 
regarding the place of classical humanities in curricula for the upper classes (at the time of  the Clarendon 
Commission in 1861), see Simon 1974, pp. 305-9. 
9 For the UK, see Jones 2003. For a  comparative account, see Maurin 2007. 
10 Earlier statements of such a view can be found in thinkers such as Condorcet and Durkheim.  
11 On the ZEP policy, see e.g. Peignard and van Zanten 1998. These zones were rebaptised in 2006 as Réseaux 
ambition réussite and Réseaux réussite scolaire. Opinion is divided on the efficacy of the policies: they have 
promoted forms of equity over more rigid notions of educational equality, but at the same time they have led 
to stigmatization of the schools in question and consequent middle-class flight. 
12 On the links between this counter-tradition and the work of thinkers like Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall 
on popular and common culture, see e.g. Jones 2003, pp. 63, 82. 
13 It should also be noted that, within French school culture itself, recent decades have seen a rise to emphatic 
dominance of a ‘scientific’ culture at the expense of a devalued ‘literary’ culture (to the extent that central 
government have had to find deliberate ways of revalorising the image of the baccalauréat’s literary stream). 
14 See Collège de France 1985, pp. 27, 19; and Bourdieu and Gros, 2000, pp. 175, 178 (where Bourdieu’s 
‘modes de pensée’ are translated as ‘ways of thinking’). 
15 See Bourdieu 1991, pp. 35-6. For a more extended analysis of Bourdieu’s policy work on these occasions, see 
Ahearne 2010, pp. 138-50. 
16 Quoted at Lelièvre 2008, p. 95.  
17 PISA stands for the Programme for International Student Assessment. The first survey took place in 2000, 
and subsequent surveys have been conducted at three-yearly intervals. 
